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CIRCUIT SPLIT: THE RESURRECTION OF THE DE
MINIMIS EXCEPTION TO ACTIONABLE 




On April 5th, 2016, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit issued its decision in VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, and in so doing, 
re-ignited a copyright debate that has plagued musicians in varying degrees 
for the better part of the last two centuries.1 The central question at the heart 
of this debate is whether the historic practice of sampling (specifically digital 
sampling in the modern context) constitutes a violation of the original 
musician’s copyright or a mere de minimis trifle that, for one reason or 
another, wasn’t worth the time and expense of adjudication. The process of 
digital sampling, put simply, consists of one musician isolating and removing 
a segment of another’s musical recording and then adding it into a new work 
of their own creation.2 Most sampled segments are very short, typically just 
a few notes or a single chord progression, and the sampling musician often 
makes many modifications to the segment altering speed and pitch to make 
it their own.3
Historically, famous composers such as Bach and Mozart would 
borrow from their predecessors to inspire their creativity in the name of 
musical progress.4 The practice of borrowing melodies and rhythms was 
considered to be an effective way to build new compositions, and their 
audiences enjoyed listening to their reinventions.5 When the practice of 
“segment borrowing” became the focus of disputes, defendants successfully 
relied on the de minimis exception to copyright infringement.6 The full 
                                                     
* To my wife Shea, whose love and patience have made all of my accomplishments 
possible. 
1 VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2016).
2 Digital Sampling, MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 
2003).
3 See Williams v. Broadus, No. 99 Civ. 10957 MBM, 2001 WL 984714, *9 n.6 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001).
4 See generally Borrowing, THE NEW GROVE DICTIONARY OF MUSIC AND 
MUSICIANS (2d ed. 2001) 
5 See Sherri Carl Hampel, Are Samplers Getting a Bum Rap?: Copyright 
Infringement or Technological Creativity?, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 559, 584 (1992).
6 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03 
[A][2][b] (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed., 2016).
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maxim, de minimis non curat lex, translates roughly to “the law does not 
concern itself with trifles” and is applicable to all civil lawsuits.7 Although 
defendant’s experienced success using this doctrine in the past, there was a 
great deal of disagreement among the district courts as the application of the 
de minimis doctrine and whether it truly insulated the practice of sampling 
from copyright infringement.8 These disagreements likely arose because 
there are multiple definitions for what a “trifle” is in a legal context. 
Beginning in the 1990’s, courts began leaning towards much more stringent 
readings of the de minimis doctrine which favored plaintiff musician’s claims 
and discouraged the practice of sampling.9 These leanings were eventually 
ratified in 2005 by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Bridgeport 
Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films.10 The Court in Bridgeport boldly broke away 
from the “ancient” precedent of the de minimis exception and declared a new 
rule for digital sampling: “get a license or do not sample.”11 Further, it held 
all unlicensed sampling of sound recordings was copyright infringement, 
regardless of the nature of the sample, the modifications made by the 
sampling musician, or the size of the sample in relation to the new derivative 
work it was now a part of.12
As the highest court to most recently address this issue directly, the 
Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Bridgeport became a golden standard precedent for 
plaintiffs’ lawyers to use in actions against musicians participating in 
sampling. However, in early June of this year, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in 
VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone expressly disagreed with the reasoning 
Bridgeport and reopened the door, or at least the debate, for musical sampling 
amongst musicians.13 The Court stated clearly that “[t]he de minimis 
exception applies to infringement actions concerning copyrighted sound 
recordings, just as it applies to all other copyright infringement actions,” and 
emphasized the importance of analyzing the size and nature of the segment 
of music being sampled.14
This note argues that the de minimis exception to copyright should 
apply to sampled sound recordings and that the Ninth Circuit was correct in 
its application of the doctrine. It begins, in Part II, with a general background 
                                                     
7 De minimis non curat lex, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
8 Stephen R. Wilson, Music Sampling Lawsuits: Does Looping Music Samples
Defeat the De Minimis Defense?, 1 J. HIGH TECH. L. 179, 180 (2002) (noting the 
circular problem that occurs where many sampling cases are settled out of court 
because lack of precedent makes court unpredictable).
9 See Joanna Demers, Steal This Music: How Intellectual Property Law Affects 
Musical Creativity, SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 1 (2006).
10 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005).
11 Id. at 801.
12 Id.
13 VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2016)
14 Id. at 884.
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of the de minimis exception, its place within the traditional legal analysis of 
copyrighting infringement, and its justification for application in the realm 
of copyright law. Part III will focus on the Bridgeport case and the 
justifications use by the Sixth Circuit to explain its decision. This will include 
a description of how the Bridgeport decision is a radical break from 
traditional de minimis applications. Part IV will examine the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in VMG and how the court justified its movement back towards 
traditional legal principles. Finally, Part V presents an argument for why the 
Ninth Circuit’s application of the de minimis doctrine should be the 
precedential standard used by all courts evaluating a conflict over sampled 
sound recordings. 
II. THE DE MINIMIS EXCEPTION
A. History and Background
The full maxim, de minimis non curat lex, translates roughly to “the 
law does not concern itself with trifles.”15 Although there has been some 
debate as to the exact translation of the phrase, the general idea is that while 
some things may technically be illegal, they are too small and insignificant 
to waste the time and resources of the court.16 The use of the de minimis 
doctrine as a defense to accusation of legal misconduct can be traced back to 
fifteenth century English civil law,17 and today it is applicable to a wide array 
of legal disputes.18 In fact, it has become so engrained in our modern judicial 
system that the Supreme Court has said, "the venerable maxim de minimis 
non curat lex . . . is part of the established background of legal principles 
against which all enactments are adopted, and which all enactments [absent 
contrary indication] are deemed to accept."19
In the context of copyright, the de minimis doctrine has come to rest 
as a defense to accusations of copyright infringement.20For the better part of 
the last century. one of the key elements of a prima facie case of copyright 
infringement is a demonstration that a copyrighted work was, in fact, 
                                                     
15 De minimis non curat lex, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
16 Nemerofsky, supra note 9, at 324.
17 Max L. Veech & Charles R. Moon, De Minimis Non Curat Lex, 45 MICH. L.
REV. 537, 538 (1947).
18 Nemerofsky, supra note 9, at 324.
19 Wis. Dep't of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U.S. 214, 231 (1992).
20 See generally Toulmin v. Rike-Kumler Co., 137 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 533 (S.D. Ohio 
1962), aff’d, 316 F.2d 232 (6th Cir. 1963) (copying of a sentence and a half from a 
book of 142 pages held de minimis); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 
255, 267 (5th Cir. 1988) (30 characters out of 50 pages of source code held de
minimis); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 588 
(1985) (300 words out of 200,000 clearly substantial, and also too great to justify 
fair use defense).
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copied.21 However, not all copying constitutes copyright infringement. For a 
claim of copyright infringement to stand there must be a substantial similarity 
between the plaintiff’s copyrighted work and the work of the defendant in 
question.22 Many courts have distinguished two types of substantial 
similarity.23 First, there is “comprehensive nonliteral similarity,” in which the 
"fundamental essence or structure" is copied even if specific expression is 
not.24 Second, and most commonly applied to cases of digital sampling, is 
“fragmented literal similarity,” in which small bits of specific expression are 
copied but the overall structure is not.25 When employing the fragmented 
literal similarity test, the courts use the de minimis doctrine to measure 
substantial similarity, holding that substantial similarity is only present if the 
amount of literal expression copied is not de minimis.26 In this way, de 
minimis becomes a defense to copyright infringement. If a copying, or 
sampling, is de minimis, then a substantial similarity does not exist and a 
copyright infringement has not taken place.27
Evaluating whether a musician’s sampling or “use” constitutes a de 
minimis use or an infringement is, for now, a decision that must be made 
based on the specific facts of the case because no clear standard for de 
minimis evaluations has been set by the courts.28 However, courts have 
typically looked to factors such as the amount of copying that took place, the 
nature of the portion that was copied, and the purpose for which the copying 
took place.29 Put another way, the courts are evaluating whether the copied 
material that was sampled is qualitatively and quantitatively important to the 
plaintiff’s work.30 Thus, a sampling can be very small and yet so significant 
to the plaintiff’s work that it constitutes an infringement and vice versa.31
                                                     
21 See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1946) (discussing the 
elements of copying and unlawful appropriation).
22 4 NIMMER, supra note 6, § 13.03[A].
23 See, e.g., Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1195-97 (9th Cir. 2004); Warner 
Bros. Inc. v. Am. Broad. Co., Inc., 720 F.2d 231, 239-42 (2d Cir. 1983).
24 4 NIMMER, supra note 6, § 13.03[A][1].
25 Id. § 13.03[A][2].
26 See Newton, 388 F.3d at 1193.
27 Id. 
28 See Susan J. Latham, Newton v. Diamond: Measuring the Legitimacy of 
Unauthorized Compositional Sampling - A Clue Illuminated and Obscured, 26
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 119, 139-44 (2003) (“[A] clear standard for de 
minimis use has not yet been settled upon in the courts”).
29 See, e.g., Newton, 388 F.3d at 1193 (holding de minimis a three note sequence 
and one background note taken from a Beastie Boys song); Elsmere Music, Inc. v. 
Nat'l Broad. Co., 482 F. Supp. 741, 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding that four notes 
for a Saturday Night Live skit from the song "I Love New York," which contained 
45 words and 100 measures, was more than a de minimis taking, but copying 
constituted fair use as a parody);
30 4 NIMMER, supra note 6, § 13.03[A][2][a].
31 Id.
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This result compliments the ideals of protecting a plaintiff’s economic rights 
to their creation while not being so restrictive as to discourage future 
creativity from other artists for fear of copyright infringement.32 However, 
disagreements over this legal theology have led to the recent split between 
the Ninth and Sixth Circuit Courts over the application of the de minimis 
defense to digital sampling.
B. The Traditional Substantial Similarity Analysis and The Concept 
of Fragmented Literal Similarity
Before the practice of digital sampling and its place in the in the realm 
of copyright law can be evaluated, the traditional approach to evaluating 
whether or not a copyright infringement has taken place between authors, 
artists, musicians or otherwise must be understood. In fact, it is crucial to 
understanding why the Court in VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone came to the 
conclusion that it did and why their ruling on the practice of digital sampling 
is far superior to the Sixth Circuits 2006 ruling in Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. 
Dimension Films.
In general, for a plaintiff to succeed on a claim alleging that a defendant 
has performed “actionable copying,” and in turn committed a copyright 
infringement against them, they must be able to establish that (1) copying did 
in fact take place and (2) the copying in question is “substantially similar” to 
the plaintiff’s original work.33 In fact, it is well established law that “even 
where the fact of copying is conceded, no legal consequences will follow 
from that fact unless the copying is substantial.”34 The Supreme Court’s 
repeated denial of certiorari in cases such as Newton v. Diamond, alleging 
that the substantial similarity analysis is either improper or unnecessary to 
establish claims of copyright infringement, is just one of many evidences that 
serves to establish that the substantial similarity element is necessary to 
copyright infringement claims.35 However, even with this in mind, the 
question of what exactly constitutes a “substantial similarity” still remains a 
semi-vague concept begging further inquiry. The following are some 
guidelines and general principles have been established that serve to both aid 
in defining substantial similarity and also make it incredibly difficult.
Generally speaking, there is a bit of common sense involved in defining 
substantial similarity such as the fact that similarities that are “slight or trivial 
similarities are not substantial” and therefore do not pass the substantial 
                                                     
32 See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 
417, 450 (1984) (noting that copyright is intended to encourage and incentivize 
creativity by rewarding the holder, as Congress intended).
33 4 NIMMER, supra note 6, § 13.03[A].
34 Newton, 388 F.3d at 1193 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1114 (2005).
35 See id.
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similarity analysis.36 For example, in Prunté v. Universal Music Group, Inc.,
the Court explained that the Plaintiff, a hip-hop musician, could not establish 
a substantial similarity between his and another hip-hop musician’s songs 
simply because the Plaintiff’s song repeatedly use the phrase “Fire in Da 
Hole” while the Defendant’s repeatedly used the phrase “Fire in The Hole.”37
This kind of ruling can be hard to grasp for some people because there is 
almost no difference between the two phrases and almost no difference seems 
like it would qualify for the definition of “substantially similar.” To make the 
issue even more confusing and difficult, it is also well established law that 
that two works do not need to be identical to qualify as substantially similar.38
Finally, to further complicate the issue of substantial similarity, the decades 
of judicial decisions have given rise to two separate strains of substantial 
similarity, which Nimmer on Copyright refers to as “Comprehensive Non-
Literal Similarity”, and “Fragmented Literal Similarity.”39 Comprehensive 
Non-Literal Similarity refers to copying “where the fundamental essence or 
structure of one work is duplicated in another,” regardless of whether or not 
it is actually identical or merely similar.40 Fragmented Literal Similarity on
the other hand refers to copying where a portion, but not all, of one artist’s 
work, be it a musician or otherwise, is literally copied and used by another 
artist.41 Since the concept of Comprehensive Non-Literal Similarity does not 
apply to digital music sampling and the process for employing the concept of 
it is, honestly, very convoluted with various tests and opinions for how it is 
to be evaluated, it will be foregone in this evaluation.42 Fragmented Literal 
Similarity, however, is highly applicable because it lies at the very core of 
digital sampling.43 Musicians take a literal fragment of one song and use it as 
their own.44
In tracing the development of Fragmented Literal Similarity in 
copyright infringement cases, Nimmer poses an important question 
concerning this important legal concept’s application to the substantial 
similarity analysis:
[W]here there is literal similarity (virtually, though not 
necessarily, completely word for word) between plaintiff’s 
                                                     
36 4 NIMMER, supra note 6, § 13.03[A].
37 Prunté v. Universal Music Grp., Inc., 699 F. Supp. 2d 15, 25-26 (D.D.C. 2010),
aff’d, 425 Fed. Appx. 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
38 See, e.g., Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090 (2d 
Cir. 1977) (holding that the two works were substantially similar due to the lay 
definition of the phrase).
39 4 NIMMER, supra note 6, § 13.03[A].
40 Id. § 13.03[A][1].
41 See id. § 13.03[A][2].
42 See id. § 13.03[A].
43 See id. § 13.03[A][2][b].
44 See 4 NIMMER, supra note 6, § 13.03[A][2][b].
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and defendant’s works, the difficult problem discussed in the 
preceding subsection does not arise. That is, it is not 
necessary to determine the level of abstraction at which 
similarity ceases to consist of an “expression of ideas,” 
because literal similarity by definition is always a similarity 
as to the expression of ideas. But suppose the similarity, 
although literal, is not comprehensive—that is, the 
fundamental substance, or skeleton or overall scheme, of the 
plaintiff’s work has not been copied; no more than a line, or 
a paragraph, or a page or chapter of the copyrighted work 
has been appropriated. At what point does such fragmented 
similarity become substantial so as to constitute the 
borrowing an infringement?45
Nimmer responds to these important questions by stating:
[N]o easy rule of thumb can be stated as to the quantum of
fragmented literal similarity permitted without crossing the
line of substantial similarity. The question in each case is
whether the similarity relates to matter that constitutes a
substantial portion of plaintiff’s work—not whether such
material constitutes a substantial portion of defendant’s
work.46
The Supreme Court declared their approval of this rule in Perris v. Hexamer
in 1878.47 In Perris, the Court evaluated a claim of copyright infringement 
brought by the owner of some copyrighted maps of New York City against a 
cartographer who created similar maps of the city of Philadelphia.48 Although 
the maps were of a different city altogether, the defendant cartographer used 
“substantially the same system of coloring and signs, and consequently 
substantially the same key that had been adopted by the complainants.”49 In 
evaluating the rights of the copyright holder to the New York maps, the Court 
stated “a copyright gives the author or the publisher the exclusive right of 
multiplying copies of what he has written or printed. It follows that to 
infringe this right a substantial copy of the whole or of a material part must 
be produced.”50 With this rule in mind, the Court held that the Defendant did 
not violate the Plaintiffs’ copyright and did nothing more than “to use to some 
extent their system of arbitrary signs and their key.”51 While the Court did 
not use the term “de minimis” to describe their opinion, the resulting 
                                                     
45 Id. § 13.03[A][2].
46 Id. § 13.03[A][2][a].
47 Perris v. Hexamer, 99 U.S. 674 (1878).
48 Id. at 675.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 675-76.
51 Id. at 676.
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application is the same. No reasonable juror would have looked at the two 
maps and seen the color schemes, arbitrary signs, and interpretive key to be 
uniquely belonging to one map owner or the other. Thus, the use was de 
minimis.
Although this effectual chase across the United States legal history 
may seem possibly redundant, over complicated, or perhaps even over 
simplified, it establishes this very important point; the evaluation of 
copyright infringement claims in the United States Judicial System is a long 
standing and consistently evaluated set of guiding principles. The substantial 
similarity analysis and the concept that Nimmer describes as 
“Comprehensive Non-Literal Similarity”52 have been endorsed and 
employed by U.S. Courts for over 150 years.53 A long standing history of 
case law such as this serves to highlight and emphasize the argument set forth 
in in sections III-V below. Stated simply, the Sixth Circuit’s argument for a 
new method for evaluating copyright infringement claims in the context of 
digital sampling by musicians not only doesn’t make sense but it is 
inappropriate given the traditional method’s long standing use and the
Supreme Court’s denial to review it despite numerous opportunities. 
III. THE BRIDGEPORT DECISION
A. The Facts
In the early 2000’s, Bridgeport Music sued Dimension Films for 
digitally sampling two seconds of a guitar chord from Funkadelic’s “Get Off 
Your Ass and Jam.”54 Public Enemy altered the recording of the guitar chord 
by changing the pitch.55 They then looped the altered recording five times to 
create a version of the two second recording that extended sixteen beats in 
length.56 This new segment of music was then inserted into N.W.A.’s song 
“100 Miles and Runnin’,” which would then go on to be used in the 
soundtrack for the movie “Hook Up.”57 Unfortunately for Bridgeport Music, 
the District Court used the traditional application of the de minimis 
doctrine.58 The District Court concluded that while the original recording of 
the notes taken were unique to the artist and thus actionable, the sampling 
that had taken place did not “rise to the level of legally cognizable 
appropriation.”59 In sum, the digital sampling that Public Enemy had 
participated in was de minimis. The Plaintiffs did not dispute the material 
                                                     
52 4 NIMMER, supra note 6, § 13.03[A][2]. 
53 Perris, 99 U.S. at 674.
54 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 796 (6th Cir. 2005).
55 Id. at 796.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 795.
58 Id.
59 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 797.
2017 Circuit Split: The Resurrection of the De Minimis Exception to 49
Actionable Copyright Infringement for Copyrighted Sound Recordings
findings of the District Court.60 The heart of their argument was that the de 
minimis exception should have never been available to the defendants 
because they had intentionally taken sound recordings that belonged to 
Bridgeport Music for the defendants’ own use.61 Simply put, they wanted the 
District Court to declare that stealing of any shape or form is stealing.
B. A Break From Tradition
The courts have typically been hesitant to create new bright line rules 
about copyright law. As the District Court in Bridgeport clearly stated, their 
role has been to “balance the interests protected by the copyright laws against 
the stifling effect that overly rigid enforcement of these laws may have on 
the artistic development of new works.”62 However, while hearing 
Bridgeport’s claims on appeal, the Sixth Circuit boldly broke away from the 
traditional balancing role and decisively concluded “get a license or do not 
sample.”63 The Court’s decision represented a landmark change in the field 
of copyright law. It simply eliminated the long-standing staple, substantial 
similarity, from the infringement analysis in the 6th Circuit.64 To be fair, it’s 
important to note that the Court in Bridgeport was very careful to limit their 
holding only to the application of digitally recorded music sampling.65 The 
change was made in an attempt to establish a bright line rule that would 
reduce disputes and litigation among artists in the future, since this kind of 
sampling was causing more and more disputes and litigation in the music 
industry.66
C. The Argument Behind the Case
Although the Sixth Circuit’s holding was a rather drastic one, it 
wasn’t without justification or reason. According to 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (also 
known as the Copyright Act), sound recording copyright holders possess the 
exclusive right “to duplicate the sound recording in the form of phono-
records or copies that directly or indirectly recapture the actual sounds fixed 
in the recording. The exclusive right of the owner of copyright in a sound 
recording under clause (2) of section 106 is limited to the right to prepare a 
derivative work in which the actual sounds fixed in the sound recording are 
                                                     
60 Id. at 798.
61 Id.
62 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 230 F. Supp. 2d 830, 840 (M.D.
Tenn. 2002).
63 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 801.
64 4 NIMMER, supra note 6, § 13.03[A] ("[S]ubstantial similarity between the 
plaintiff's and defendant's works is an essential element of actionable copying."); 
see also Andrew Inesi, A Theory of De Minimis and A Proposal For Its Application
in Copyright, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 945, 965 (2006).
65 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 798-99.
66 Id.
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rearranged, remixed, or otherwise altered in sequence or quality.”67 The 
Bridgeport Court contended that that the exclusive rights of the owner of any 
copyright in any sound recording under section 106 clauses (1) and (2) of 
section 106 “do not extend to the making or duplication of another sound 
recording that consists entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds, 
even though such sounds imitate or simulate those in the copyrighted sound 
recording.”68 Although the interpretation of 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) has been up 
for debate in the past, the Sixth Circuit adopted a straightforward, black letter 
reading of the law because the legislative history did not help interpret the 
Copyright Act.69 The Court stated, “In other words, a sound recording owner 
has the exclusive right to “sample” his own recording.”70
The Court provided three reasons to justify this black letter reading 
of 17 U.S.C. § 114(b).71 The first justification was ease of enforcement for 
future digital sampling disputes.72 The Court created a simple rule: “Get a 
license or do no sample.”73 By creating this rule, the Court left little room 
open for interpretation for future artists that may be tempted to take segments 
of songs to add onto their own. This requirement does not put an undue 
burden on creativity, and it does not prevent future artists from simply 
recreating the same set of notes in his own studio rather than making an actual 
copy of the original artist’s sound recording for his own sampling purposes.74
In other words, an artist could re-record the exact same set of notes they wish 
to use rather than taking an electronic copy of those notes from another 
artist’s song. Because the Court limited their holding to the practice of digital 
sampling only, it left the door open for an artist to re-record the notes they 
needed for their derivative work. They could then simply make a claim of 
“intellectual taking” by coincidence if a dispute arose, rather than actually 
taking the original artist’s recording and inserting it into a derivative work.75
The second reason provided by the Court was an economical one. 
The Court explained that the market would control the price of licensing 
recordings and keep it within reasonable bounds.76 They argued that “the
sound recording copyright holder cannot exact a license fee greater than what 
it would cost the person seeking the license to just duplicate the sample in 
the course of making the new recording.”77 Given the profits that a musician 
                                                     
67 Id. at 800.
68 Id. at 800 (citing 17 U.S.C. §114(2012)). 
69 Id. at 805.




74 See id., at 800-801.
75 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 802.
76 Id. at 801.
77 Id.
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was likely to make from the creation of his derivative work, it did not seem 
unreasonable for the Court to require that artists pay the original artist a 
licensing fee if they weren’t going to simply re-record the notes they needed 
in their own studio. Furthermore, it would likely be much cheaper to simply 
pay for a license to use segments of another artist’s song rather than to pay 
for the litigation if and when a dispute arises from the taking.78
The third justification given by the Court is more of a moral reason 
in that digital sampling is simply “never accidental.”79 The Court explained, 
“It is not like the case of a composer who has a melody in his head, perhaps 
not even realizing that the reason he hears this melody is that it is the work 
of another which he had heard before. When you sample a sound recording 
you know you are taking another's work product.”80 Taken together, these 
three justifications satisfy the balance that courts constantly juggle between 
the ownerships rights of the copyright holder and the benefits the general 
public enjoys from having limited restrictions on creativity.81 In sum, it 
would seem that this bright line rule would cut down on the courts’ time 
evaluating each sampling of sound recordings among musicians and it will 
save the musicians time and money because it is likely cheaper to license 
sound recordings than to litigate the disputes over them.82 The Sixth Circuit’s 
holding in Bridgeport would remain an unchallenged break from the 
traditional application of analyzing substantial similarity and the traditional 
application of the de minimis doctrine for a decade until the Ninth Circuit 
issued its opinion in VMG Salsoul.
IV. VMG SALSOUL, LLC V. CICCONE
A. The Facts
In June of 2016, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its 
opinion in VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone and called into question the Sixth 
Circuit’s Bridgeport decision for the first time in ten years.83 Appealing 
from summary judgment entered by the District Court holding that the 
infringement that took place was de minimis, the Plaintiff, VMG Salsoul, 
claims that Madonna Ciccone violated its copyright to the song “Love
Break” through the practice of digital sampling.84 The sampling that 
involved a recorded 0.23-second segment of horn blasts that had been used 
                                                     
78 Id. at 802.
79 Id. at 801.
80 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 801.
81 Id. at 801-02; see also Lauren Fontein Brandes, Case Comment, From Mozart to
Hip-Hop: The Impact of Bridgeport v. Dimension Films on Musical Creativity, 14
UCLA ENT. L. REV. 93, 112. 
82 Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 802.
83 VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2016).
84 Id. 
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in the song “Love Break.”85 The segment was taken by the Defendant and 
incorporated in her song “Vogue,” which met tremendous success.86 There 
are two different versions of “Vogue” that the horn blast segment was used 
in.87 There is a “radio edit” and a compilation version.88 The horn blasts 
occur four times in the radio edit version and six times in the compilation 
version.89 Similar to Bridgeport, the Plaintiff established that the defendant 
had, in fact, taken the segment intentionally and had thereby participated in 
digital sampling.90 Factually speaking, the Bridgeport and VMG cases are 
nearly identical in the accusations being made and the length and use of the 
digitally sampled recording.
B. The Argument
Despite the similarities between the two cases, the Ninth Circuit took 
the more traditional approach to interpreting the law of copyright. The 
approach was in direct conflict with the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation.91
Instead of holding musicians to a strict “no copying” standard when it comes 
to digital sampling, the Court reiterated from its past decisions that proof of 
actual copying is insufficient to establish copyright infringement.92 The 
Court explained, “For an unauthorized use of a copyrighted work to be 
actionable, the use must be significant enough to constitute infringement. 
This means that even where the fact of copying is conceded, no legal
consequences will follow from that fact unless the copying is substantial.”93
In other words, the Court did not see it as wise or within their power to alter 
hundreds of years of traditional copyright law. They chose to instead 
maintain the traditional substantial use analysis that has been employed in 
the past when one party brought claims of copyright infringement against 
another. The Court went on to explain that the “principle that trivial copying
does not constitute actionable infringement has long been a part of copyright
law.”94 This is emphasized by the fact that this has been the attitude towards
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93 VMG, 824 F.3d at 877 (emphasis added) (citing Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d
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copyright infringement in the arts for over one hundred years.95 This is in
blatant support of the legal maxim de minimis non curat lex. As the Ninth
Circuit re-emphasized, “[T]o establish its infringement claim, Plaintiff must 
show that the copying was greater than de minimis.”96 To reach a level that 
is greater than de minimis, the copying in question must be so great that 
through “ordinary observations” it is recognizable as the work of another.97
In other words, if the copying is so small that the average audience would not 
recognize it, then it is de minimis and does not qualify as copyright 
infringement.98
Turning to the specific facts of the VMG case, the Ninth Circuit
emphasized the fact that the horn blasts that were used by the Defendant were
not “copied precisely.”99 According to the Plaintiff’s own expert witness, the 
copied portion “was modified by transposing it upward, cleaning up the 
attack slightly in order to make it punchier [by truncating the horn hit] and 
overlaying it with other sounds and effects. One such effect mimicked the 
reverse cymbal crash…the reverb/delay 'tail'…was prolonged and 
heightened.”100 In addition, the horn blasts used by the Defendant were not 
isolated sounds that were unique to the Plaintiff’s song “Love Break.” In both 
“Love Break” and “Vogue,” there are other instruments playing at the same 
time and the horn blasts are blended into the music. After listening to the
sound recordings that were submitted by both parties, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that “a reasonable juror could not conclude that an average 
audience would recognize the appropriation of the horn hit.”101 This 
conclusion was ironically supported by the Plaintiff’s primary expert witness 
when he accidentally misidentified the horn blasts that were sampled from 
“Love Break” in his original report.102 After taking all of these facts into 
account, the Court saw no need for anything more than a “dry analysis” to 
                                                     
95 West Publ'g Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., 169 F. 833, 861 (E.D.N.Y. 1909)
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come to the “common sense conclusion” that the copying in question was de 
minimis and did not constitute copyright infringement.103
V. REBUTTING BRIDGEPORT
A. Substantial Use
At the heart of the Court’s decision in the VMG case is the idea that 
because an insignificant portion of the song “Love Break” was digitally 
sampled, no reasonable person would be able to recognize the sampling that 
has taken place.104 That is to say, the Court applied the traditional substantial 
similarity analysis referenced above and came to the conclusion that no 
substantial similarity existed, fragmented or otherwise.105 Therefore, the 
sampling done by the Defendant was de minimis and no copyright 
infringement had taken place.106 However, the justification for this position 
runs deeper than the simplistic notion that nobody can tell something was 
stolen, so nothing was stolen.
The rule that copying only constitutes copyright infringement when 
a substantial portion of the work is taken is a doctrine that has been firmly 
established and accepted in our judicial system for more than a century.107 In 
fact, Nimmer on Copyright, the leading copyright treatise of our time, traces 
this legal doctrine back into the mid-nineteenth century.108
The reasoning for this rule lies primarily within the economic rights 
of the copyright holder.109 In VMG the Ninth Circuit explained that the 
“plaintiff’s legally protected interest is the potential financial return from his 
compositions which derive from the lay public’s approbation of his 
efforts.”110 However, if public concert audiences and average private music 
purchasers do not recognize that digital sampling has taken place, then the 
“sampler” has not actually gained any financial benefit from using the digital 
sample. Accordingly, the original creator whose work was digitally sampled 
has not lost any financial benefit because of the sampling. As a result, the 
creator’s legal interests have not been violated and no infringement can be 
said to have taken place.
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At this point, it’s worth noting that while the VMG and Bridgeport
cases deal with what is referred to as a “fragmented literal similarity,” there 
is another version of this analysis called “comprehensive nonliteral 
similarity” that also supports the holding of VMG.111 “Comprehensive literal 
similarity” is described by Nimmer as: 
[A] similarity not just as to a particular line or paragraph or
other minor segment, but where the fundamental essence or
structure of one work is duplicated in another. If such
duplication is literal or verbatim, then clearly substantial
similarity results. The problem here under scrutiny is the
situation where there is comprehensive similarity but no
word-for-word or other literal similarity.112
This is what the Second Circuit has labeled as “inexact copyright
infringement.”113 It’s important to realize that the “substantial similarity”
involved in “comprehensive nonliteral similarity” and also the “fragmented
literal similarity” analysis in VMG and Bridgeport can be reached even if a
defendant merely paraphrased a plaintiff’s work rather than copying it
verbatim.114 As the infamous Judge Learned Hand has said, copyright 
“cannot be limited literally to the text, else a plagiarist would escape by 
immaterial variations.”115
This concept, while seemingly reasonable, is in direct opposition to 
the longstanding copyright principle that an owner’s copyright does not 
protect against the fair use of abstract ideas contained within a copyrighted 
work.116 So, in essence, it is possible to use the abstract ideas employed by 
the copyright holder of another work without reaching the “substantial 
similarity” necessary to qualify as actionable copyright infringement.117
However, this creates a conundrum for the area of copyright law. According 
to Nimmer, “if copyright protection is not limited to literal reproduction but 
does not prevent the borrowing of ideas, what sort of similarity short of the 
verbatim will constitute substantial similarity?”118 Unfortunately, no clear cut 
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answer has been produced by the courts.119 However, Nimmer explains, 
“[t]he courts have answered this inquiry with the vague formula that if the
defendant’s work copies not merely the idea, but the expression of the idea
contained in plaintiff’s work, then the two works are substantially similar and
infringement may be found.”120 In addition, the House Report from the
Copyright Act of 1976 “expressly endorses and perpetuates, under the
current Act, this ‘idea-expression’ dichotomy, so that it is now statutorily
codified. This, however, is but a reformulation not a solution of the
problem.”121As we can see from both VMG’s “fragmented literal similarity”
analysis and the “comprehensive literal similarity” analysis, VMG took the
correct course of action in applying the de minimis exception to copyright in
the case of digitally sampled sound recordings. However, the House Report
from the Copyright Act of 1976, cited by both VMG and Bridgeport, is the
heart of the most controversial argument for the treatment of the de minimis
doctrine and digitally sampled sound recordings.
B. Statutory Interpretation
The linchpin at the very center of the Bridgeport Court’s break from 
traditional applications of substantial similarity and the de minimis doctrine 
is their interpretation of section 114(b) of The Copyright Act of 1976 (also 
known as 17 U.S.C § 114(b)).122 Section 114(b), "Scope of Exclusive Rights 
in Sound Recordings”, of the act states in relevant part:
The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound 
recording under clauses (1) and (2) of section 106 [17 USCS
§ 106] do not extend to the making or duplication of another 
sound recording that consists entirely of an independent 
fixation of other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or 
simulate those in the copyrighted sound recording.123
The section 106 that section 114(b) is referring to is titled "Exclusive Rights 
in Copyrighted Works," and those exclusive rights are as follows:
Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright 
under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize 
any of the following:
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(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or 
phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted 
work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted 
work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or 
by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and 
choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and 
other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work 
publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and 
choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or 
sculptural works, including the individual images of a 
motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the 
copyrighted work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the 
copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio 
transmission.124
The Bridgeport Court rested their entire conclusion on the single word 
“entirely” in section 114(B) when evaluating the copyright infringement 
claim in front of them and blatantly stated there was no reason to look beyond 
that word.125 They placed their emphasis in this particular area based on 
legislative history.126 Prior to the Copyright Act of 1976 there was the Sound 
Recording Act of 1971.127 The Copyright Act of 1976 quotes the language of 
the Sound Recording Act of 1971 verbatim in section 114(B) except for the 
addition of the word “entirely.”128 The significance of this word rests on its 
implication concerning the scope of liability for potential copiers. The 
function of section 114(b) is to provide an immunizing effect for a creator, 
in this case a musician, who creates a song that sounds the same as another 
musician’s song without literally using a recording of the original work in 
their own music.129 Or in other words, they created a song without digital 
sampling that happen to sound like another musician’s work. By inserting the 
word “entirely” into the sentence, lawmakers clarified that if no sound bites 
were literally recorded (i.e. no digital sampling took place) and copied in the 
second musician’s new work then that musician would be exempt from 
liability to the first musician. The similarity would just be happenstance or 
coincidence. From this, the Bridgeport Court performed a very large logical 
leap, in fact a logical fallacy, by jumping to the conclusion that if no presence 
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of digital sampling equaled no liability then some presence of digital 
sampling equaled automatic liability.130 This logical jump was so severe that 
after stating that the word “entirely” had been added into the Copyright Act, 
they simply concluded in their very next sentence, “In other words, a sound 
recording owner has the exclusive right to ‘sample’ his own recording. We 
find much to recommend this interpretation.”131 They then proceeded to list 
off the three benefits that would come with this approach to evaluating digital 
sampling among musicians referenced in Part II above.132 So, in one foul 
swoop the Sixth Circuit not only invented a new legal analysis for an already 
well-established process with a stretched out statutory interpretation, but they 
also did away with the de minimis exception to copyright infringement at the 
same time. By getting rid of it with such a hard, black line rule commanding 
the public “[g]et a license or do not sample,”133 the Court ironically was 
actually saying the opposite of de minimis non curat lex. That is to say, it 
would appear that the Sixth Circuit does in fact concern itself with trifles. 
In rebutting the Bridgeport Court’s argument that the statutory 
interpretation revealed that their decision was the will of lawmakers in 
Congress, the VMG Court explained, “nothing in that provision suggests 
differential treatment of de minimis copying of sound recordings compared 
to, say, sculptures. Although subsection (6) deals exclusively with sound 
recordings, that subsection concerns public performances; nothing in its text 
bears on de minimis copying.”134 Not only does the Ninth Circuit quickly 
dismiss the Sixth Circuit’s fallacious assumptions about sound recordings, 
but it also highlights the fact that the Sixth Circuit misapprehended the 
statutory structure of the Copyright Act of 1976 in their application of it to 
the Bridgeport facts.135 Instead of skipping immediately to section 114(b), 
the Ninth Circuit began its analysis with section 106 because it is the only 
section of the Copyright Act that provides copyright holders with rights and 
protections.136 From that point forward, sections 107 through 122 are all 
limitations on those rights and restrictions as to when they can be 
exercised.137 With this in mind, the very fact that the Sixth Circuit used a 
provision that actually limits the rights of copyright holding plaintiffs to 
create extra rights for those plaintiffs seems kind of absurd on its very face. 
The Ninth Circuit’s VMG decision emphasized the absurdity saying, “[a] 
straightforward reading of the third sentence in section 114(b) reveals 
Congress' intended limitation on the rights of a sound recording copyright 
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holder: A new recording that mimics the copyrighted recording is not an 
infringement, even if the mimicking is very well done, so long as there was 
no actual copying.”138 If this wasn’t enough, the House Report for section 
114(b) reflects Congress's intent to recognize the de minimis doctrine for 
sound recordings, which by its very nature makes the Bridgeport decision 
wrong.139 The report states, “subsection (b) of section 114 makes clear that 
… infringement [of a sound recording copyright] takes place whenever all or 
any substantial portion of the actual sounds that go to make up a copyrighted 
sound recording are reproduced" through various recording methods.”140 And 
as Nimmer points out, because Congress took the time to articulate that 
“infringement takes place whenever all or any substantial portion of the 
actual sounds . . . are reproduced,” it is clear that they were well aware of the 
de minimis exception and its function in copyright law.141
VI. CONCLUSION
In sum, the 6th Circuit Court’s decision in the 2006 case Bridgeport 
Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films was incorrectly decided. Over 150 years of 
case law precedent was in no way on their side as they invented a new 
analysis for copyright infringement via digital sampling and simultaneously 
eliminated the de minimis exception. Neither, in fact was general logic. Most 
undergraduate students taking Philosophy 101 learn the dangers of 
contrapositive fallacious assumptions but the Sixth Circuit seems to have 
walked right into one. In addition, the very law they were relying on to 
support their decision was read in a manner that made little to no sense 
because they ignored its statutory structure. And finally, the Congress whose 
role it is to create these laws and whose law-making shoes the Sixth Circuit 
suddenly stepped into had expressly disagreed with this type of ruling in 
advance by stating in their house report that substantial similarity had to be 
present for copyright infringement to be established not merely the presence 
of copying. The Sixth Circuit simply got this one wrong. 
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